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Abstract
The political system in China is often referred to as political meritocracy. This
study develops a simple model of political economy to explore the strengths and weak-
nesses of a meritocratic system (in which political meritocrats design economic policies)
relative to a democratic system (dominated by the median voter). We nd that polit-
ical meritocrats would choose economic policies that are more conducive to economic
activities and lead to higher income but less public goods. Whether the meritocratic
or democratic equilibrium achieves a higher level of social welfare depends on the dis-
tribution of individuals abilities. If the ability of the median voter is lower than the
mean of the population, then the meritocratic equilibrium may achieve a higher level of
social welfare than the democratic equilibrium. In this case, there is a threshold degree
of political inclusiveness in the meritocratic system above which political meritocracy
dominates democracy in terms of social welfare, and this threshold degree of political
inclusiveness is increasing in the ability of the median voter.
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Over the past three decades, China has evolved a political system that can
best be described as "political meritocracy". Bell (2015)
1 Introduction
In China, the Politburo (a group of 25 leaders of the Communist Party) oversees the party,1
which governs the country. The Politburo is nominally elected by the Central Committee,
which comprises other leaders of the party and currently has 205 full members. Members
of the Central Committee are elected once every ve years by the National Congress. The
roughly 3000 delegates of the National Congress are in turn elected by provincial congresses.
In other words, the Communist Party of China operates a system of elections in which dele-
gates at one level vote for delegates to the next level. The attainment of party membership
in turn is based on political screening, educational credentials and professional expertise.
This political system in China is often referred to as "political meritocracythe idea that
political power should be distributed in accordance with ability and virtue"; see Bell (p. 6,
2015).
This study develops a simple model of political economy to explore the strengths and
weaknesses of a meritocratic system in which political meritocrats design economic policies.
Comparing such a political system to a democratic system dominated by the median voter,
we nd that political meritocrats would choose economic policies that are more conducive to
economic activities and give rise to a higher level of income,2 but a lower level of public goods
than democracy.3 Interestingly, it is possible for the meritocratic equilibrium to achieve a
higher level of social welfare. Using the utilitarian welfare function to aggregate the utility
of individuals, we nd that whether the meritocratic or democratic equilibrium achieves a
higher level of social welfare depends on the distribution of individuals abilities. If the
ability of the median voter is higher than the mean of the population, then the democratic
equilibrium would achieve a higher level of social welfare than the meritocratic equilibrium.
However, if the ability of the median voter is lower than the mean, then the democratic
equilibrium may achieve a lower level of social welfare than the meritocratic equilibrium.
The intuition of the above results can be explained as follows. Our model features
heterogeneous individuals, who have di¤erent levels of ability and earn di¤erent levels of
income. The government levies an income tax to collect tax revenue and pay for public goods.
Individuals with higher abilities earn higher income and prefer a lower tax rate. Given that
individuals preferences in the tax rate are single-peaked, the median voter theorem applies
in the case of majority voting. Because the high-ability political meritocrats prefer a lower
tax rate than the median voter, the levels of employment and output are higher but the level
of public goods is lower in the meritocratic equilibrium than in the democratic equilibrium.
Furthermore, the tax rate preferred by the median voter is generally di¤erent from the
socially optimal tax rate. If the ability of the median voter is lower than the mean of the
1Within the Politburo, there is the Standing Committee, which currently has 7 members.
2Chen et al. (2005) and Li and Zhou (2005) provide empirical evidence that provincial economic perfor-
mance has a positive and signicant e¤ect on the likelihood of promotion of provincial leaders in China.
3Lake and Baum (2001) and Deacon (2009) provide empirical evidence for a positive e¤ect of democracy
on the level of public good provision.
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population, then the median voters preferred tax rate would be higher than the socially
optimal tax rate. In contrast, the tax rate preferred by the high-ability political meritocrats
is lower than the tax rate preferred by the median voter. In this case, the meritocratic
equilibrium may achieve a higher level of social welfare by o¤setting an ine¢ciency in the
democratic equilibrium dominated by the median voter. Furthermore, there is a threshold
degree of political inclusiveness in the meritocratic system above which political meritoc-
racy dominates democracy in terms of social welfare, and this threshold degree of political
inclusiveness is increasing in the ability of the median voter relative to the mean of the
population. Therefore, as the ability of the median voter increases over time, the degree of
political inclusiveness in the meritocratic system should also increase.
This study relates to the literature on majority voting. The median voter theorem was in-
troduced and formalized in the seminal studies by Hotelling (1929), Black (1948) and Downs
(1957). Meltzer and Richard (1981) apply the median voter theorem to explore the equilib-
rium tax rate that would emerge in a general equilibrium model.4 Following this approach,
we examine the welfare di¤erence between the equilibrium tax rates chosen in a democratic
majority voting system versus the Chinese-style meritocratic voting system.5 Therefore, our
study relates most closely to the literature on theoretical studies in the Chinese political
system. In this literature, Che and Qian (1998) model the advantages of local government
ownership of rms (over private ownership and state ownership) in order to explain its im-
portance during the transition of the Chinese economy towards a market economy. Che et
al. (2017) show that self-serving autocratic leaders may choose a more optimal degree of
decentralization than democratic voters and correct an ine¢ciency in democracy. Che et al.
(2019) explore how the removal of criminal immunity of leaders may a¤ect government cor-
ruption and the economy. In dynamic growth models, Shen (2007) and Chu (2010) explore
the di¤erent conditions under which a potentially non-benevolent government would choose
growth-enhancing policies and derive implications on economic growth in China. The present
study complements studies in this literature by showing the strengths and weaknesses of the
meritocratic system in China relative to a democratic system and comparing their di¤erent
e¤ects on the economy and social welfare.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3
compares the two political equilibria. Section 4 concludes. Appendix A contains the proofs.
2 A simple model of political meritocracy
Our model is based on the general-equilibrium model of a labor economy in Meltzer and
Richard (1981) except that our model features public goods, instead of income redistribution.
In summary, the model features heterogeneous individuals with di¤erent levels of ability.
They elastically supply labor and consume their after-tax income. The government levies an
income tax and uses the tax revenue to pay for public goods.
4See also Roberts (1977).
5Ledyard (1984) is the rst study that connects utilitarianism and majority voting to explore its welfare
implications. See Krishna and Morgan (2015) for a recent study, which explores the conditions under which
majority voting may yield the optimal outcome, and a review of other studies on this topic.
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2.1 Individuals with heterogeneous abilities
There is a unit continuum of individuals i 2 [0; 1], whose abilities Ai > 0 are heterogeneous.
Abilities are randomly distributed with a general distribution whose mean is dened as
A 
Z
1
0
Aidi > 0. (1)
The ability of individual i determines her labor productivity in the production of a homoge-
neous good. Individual is production function is given by
Yi = A

i Li, (2)
where Li is the labor input of individual i and the parameter  > 0 is elasticity of individual
output with respect to individual ability. For simplicity, we set  to 0.5.6
Given that we will consider the utilitarian social welfare function, we specify a quasi-linear
utility function for individual i:7
ui = Ci  
L2i
2
+ G, (3)
where Ci is the consumption of individual i. The term L
2
i =2 captures the quadratic utility
cost of labor supply, and the parameter  > 0 determines the strength of this e¤ect. G is
the level of public goods provided by the government, and the parameter  > 1 determines
the importance of public goods to individuals.8 Individual i pays an income tax Yi, where
 2 (0; 1) is the tax rate. Then, she consumes her after-tax income such that
Ci = (1  )Yi. (4)
Substituting (2) and (4) into (3) and maximizing utility yield the level of labor as
Li =
1  

A0:5i , (5)
where we have used  = 0:5. Substituting (5) into (2) yields individual is income as
Yi =
1  

Ai, (6)
where we have also used  = 0:5. Both Li and Yi are increasing in Ai and decreasing in  .
6Our results are robust to other values of  > 0; see Appendix B.
7Our results are robust to a more general quasi-linear utility function ui = Ci   L

i = + v(G), where
 > 1, v0(:) > 0 and v00(:) < 0; see Appendix B.
8Here we focus on utility-enhancing public goods that benet all individuals equally, instead of
productivity-enhancing public infrastructure because it is not clear as to whether individuals with high or low
ability benet more from public infrastructure. For example, if we set  to zero and assume Yi = G
1 Ai Li,
then all individuals would prefer the same tax rate. However, if ability and infrastructure were complements
(substitutes) instead, then high-ability (low-ability) individuals would prefer more public infrastructure.
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2.2 Government
The government collects tax revenue to pay for public goods subject to a balanced budget:
G = 
Z
1
0
Yidi =
(1  )

A, (7)
which uses (1) and (6). G is an inverted-U function of  and captures the La¤er curve.
2.3 Optimal tax rate for an individual
We rst derive the welfare function of individual i from (3) as follows:
ui =
(1  )2

Ai  
(1  )2
2
Ai + G =
(1  )2
2
Ai + 
(1  )

A, (8)
which uses (4)-(7). The rst-order condition with respect to  is
@ui
@
=  
(1  )

Ai + 
(1  2)

A = 0, (9)
where the marginal cost of a higher tax rate is increasing in individual is ability Ai due to
the greater loss in after-tax income but the marginal benet from public goods depends on
aggregate ability A instead of individual ability Ai. Equation (9) can be re-expressed as
1   i
1  2 i
=
A
Ai
. (10)
As shown in Figure 1, (10) determines the utility maximizing tax rate for individual i as
 i = max

0;
A=Ai   1
2A=Ai   1

2 [0; 0:5), (11)
which is increasing in  and decreasing in Ai=A. In other words, an individual with a higher
ability Ai (relative to the mean A) prefers a lower tax rate.
Figure 1: Utility maximizing tax rate
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2.4 Optimal tax rate for the society
We construct the utilitarian social welfare function as the aggregate of individuals utility:
U 
Z
1
0
uidi =
(1  )2
2
A+ 
(1  )

A, (12)
where the social marginal cost of a higher tax rate depends on aggregate ability A. Also, it
is useful to note that social welfare U is an inverted-U function of the tax rate  . Taking the
rst-order condition with respect to  yields the socially optimal tax rate as
1   
1  2 
=  ,   =
   1
2   1
2 (0; 0:5), (13)
which is strictly positive (given  > 1) and increasing in .
3 Meritocracy versus democracy
In this section, we compare the di¤erent implications of the following two political equilibria
on the economy and the welfare of the society: a meritocratic equilibrium (in which political
meritocrats set the tax rate) and a democratic equilibrium (in which the median voter
determines the tax rate).
3.1 Political equilibrium tax rate under democracy
Given that individuals preferences on the tax rate are single-peaked, the median voter
theorem applies in the case of majority voting. Suppose the ability of the median voter is
denoted as Am. Then, the utility maximizing tax rate for the median voter is
m = max

0;
A=Am   1
2A=Am   1

2 [0; 0:5). (14)
Here we assume Am < A to ensure that m > 0. The median voter theorem implies that
whenever voters are choosing between m and any other tax rate, the majority would vote
for m.
9 However, m is generally di¤erent from 
 (unless the median ability Am happens to
coincide with the mean ability A in which case the social marginal cost of a higher tax rate
coincides with the private marginal cost of the median voter). If the ability of the median
voter is higher than the mean of the population, then the democratic equilibrium tax rate
m would be lower than the optimal tax rate 
, and vice versa.
9See Meltzer and Richard (1981) for a more detailed discussion.
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3.2 Political equilibrium tax rate under meritocracy
Without loss of generality, we order the individuals i 2 [0; 1] in a reverse order of abilities; i.e.,
Ai  Aj for any i  j. Meritocrats are dened as individuals i 2 [0; e], where e < 1 denotes
the mass of political elites in the society. In other words, meritocrats exclude individuals with
relatively low abilities. The inclusiveness of the meritocrats is measured by and increasing
in e. In the case of China, the set of political meritocrats may refer to (a subset of) the
members of the Politburo, the Central Committee, the National Congress, or more generally
the Communist Party, who have de facto voting power on the specic government policies
being considered. Our setup is general enough to capture the most extreme case, in which
the set of power-holding meritocrats includes only the individuals with the highest level of
ability (i.e., a very small e). Government policies are determined by majority voting among
the meritocrats i 2 [0; e].10 Once again, the median voter theorem applies, and the tax rate
is determined by the median meritocrat. We denote the meritocratic equilibrium tax rate as
 e = max

0;
A=Ae   1
2A=Ae   1

2 [0; 0:5), (15)
where Ae is the ability level of the median elite. The meritocratic equilibrium tax rate  e
is increasing in the degree of political inclusiveness e via a decrease in Ae. However, given
e < 1, it must be the case that the meritocratic equilibrium tax rate  e is lower than the
democratic equilibrium tax rate m because the median elite has a higher level of ability
than the median voter (i.e., Ae  Am).
3.3 Meritocracy versus democracy
Given that the meritocratic equilibrium tax rate  e is lower than the democratic equilibrium
tax rate m, (5) and (6) then imply that the aggregate levels of employment and output
are higher in the meritocratic equilibrium than in the democratic equilibrium, whereas (7)
implies that the level of public goods is lower in the meritocratic equilibrium than in the
democratic equilibrium.11 Therefore, government policies chosen by political meritocrats are
more conducive to economic activities and give rise to a higher level of income but a lower
level of public goods.12 We summarize this result in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1 The aggregate levels of employment and output are higher in the meritocratic
equilibrium than in the democratic equilibrium, whereas the level of public goods is lower in
the meritocratic equilibrium than in the democratic equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix A.
10Here we assume that the meritocrats are not benevolent. If they were benevolent, it would be even more
likely for the meritocratic equilibrium to yield a higher level of social welfare.
11These theoretical results are consistent with the empirical evidence in Lake and Baum (2001), Chen et
al. (2005), Li and Zhou (2005) and Deacon (2009) as discussed in the introduction.
12The higher tax rate and the higher level of public goods under democracy also imply lower inequality
in individuals utility; see Appendix C. Acemoglu et al. (2015) provide evidence on a positive (negative)
e¤ect of democracy on taxes (income inequality); however, they nd that the e¤ect on inequality is not very
robust. We nd that democracy reduces utility inequality even when income inequality is unchanged.
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As for the welfare comparison between the two political equilibria, it depends on the
distribution of individuals abilities. If the ability of the median voter is higher than the
mean of the population, then we would have the following outcome:  e  m < 
. Given
that the democratic equilibrium tax rate m is suboptimally low, the meritocratic equilibrium
tax rate  e (being even lower than m) must yield a lower level of social welfare; see Figure
2. We summarize this result in Proposition 2.
Figure 2: Welfare comparision 1
Proposition 2 If the ability of the median voter is higher than the mean of the popula-
tion, then the democratic equilibrium would achieve a higher level of social welfare than the
meritocratic equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix A.
The more realistic scenario arises when the ability of the median voter is lower than the
mean of the population,13 in which case the democratic equilibrium tax rate m would be
higher than the optimal tax rate  . Then, we have two possible outcomes: (a)     e  m
and (b)  e < 
 < m. Case (a) occurs when the political meritocrats are relatively inclusive
(i.e., a relatively large e). In this case, the meritocratic equilibrium tax rate  e is closer
to the optimal tax rate and achieves a higher level of social welfare than the democratic
equilibrium tax rate m; see Figure 3.
13If we use income as a proxy for ability, then the median income is lower than the mean income in China.
The median/mean ratio of urban residents disposable income increases from 0.88 in 2010 to 0.93 in 2019.
The median/mean ratio of rural residents disposable income increases from 0.88 in 2010 to 0.90 in 2019.
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Figure 3: Welfare comparison 2
Case (b) occurs when the political meritocrats are not very inclusive (i.e., a relatively
small e). In this case, the meritocratic equilibrium tax rate  e is below the optimal tax rate,
whereas the democratic equilibrium tax rate m is above the optimal tax rate. In this case,
it would still be possible for the meritocratic equilibrium to achieve a higher level of social
welfare than the democratic equilibrium if  e is close to 
 whereas m is far away from 
;
see Figure 4. However, if e is excessively small such that  e is far away from 
, then the
meritocratic equilibrium would achieve a lower level of social welfare than the democratic
equilibrium; see Figure 5. Proposition 3 summarizes this result.
Figure 4: Welfare comparison 3 Figure 5: Welfare comparision 4
Proposition 3 If the ability of the median voter is lower than the mean of the population,
then the meritocratic equilibrium may (but not always) achieve a higher level of social welfare
than the democratic equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Finally, if the ability of the median voter is lower than the mean of the population, there
is a threshold degree of political inclusiveness e 2 (0; 1) in the meritocratic system above
9
which political meritocracy dominates democracy in terms of social welfare; see Figure 6.14
Suppose the political meritocrats prefer a meritocratic system with a minimal degree of
political inclusiveness but need to ensure that the meritocratic system achieves at least as
high a level of social welfare as democracy in order to justify its legitimacy.15 Then, they
will set e to e. As the ability of the median voter increases relative to the mean (i.e.,
Am=A increases), the democratic equilibrium tax rate m decreases towards the optimal tax
rate  . Given that the meritocratic equilibrium tax rate  e is increasing in the degree of
political inclusiveness, the threshold degree e must increase in order for the meritocratic
equilibrium tax rate  e to increase towards the optimal tax rate 
 and restore the equality
U( e) = U(m). Therefore, the threshold degree of political inclusiveness e is increasing in
the ability of the median voter relative to the mean of the population (i.e., e(Am=A) is an
increasing function in Am=A). As the ability of the median voter converges to the mean
of the population, the threshold degree e converges to unity. In this case, the meritocratic
system must become fully inclusive in order to achieve the same level of social welfare as the
democratic system. Proposition 4 summarizes this result.
Figure 6: Threshold degree e
Proposition 4 If the ability of the median voter is lower than the mean of the population,
there is a threshold degree of political inclusiveness e 2 (0; 1) in the meritocratic system above
which political meritocracy (weakly) dominates democracy in terms of social welfare. This
threshold degree e is (weakly) increasing in the ability of the median voter relative to the
mean of the population.
Proof. See Appendix A.
14Figure 6 assumes that an interior e 2 (0; 1) exists; see the proof of Proposition 4 for other cases.
15There are di¤erent ways to formalize this mechanism. For example, Justman and Gradstein (1999) model
the dissatisfaction of individuals without voting rights as a cost to the society. Acemoglu and Robinson
(2001) model the threat of revolution initiated by individuals without voting rights. These studies apply
their models to explore the process of democratization in Britain and other European countries; see Lizzeri
and Persico (2004) for a more recent study and a discussion of other studies on this topic.
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4 Conclusion
In this study, we have developed a simple model of political economy to explore the strengths
and weaknesses of a meritocratic system relative to a democratic system. In summary, we
nd that political meritocracy is conducive to economic activities and may also lead to a
higher level of social welfare than democracy, depending on the distribution of individuals
abilities. For a developing country in which mass schooling is not widespread, the ability
of the median voter is likely to be below the mean of the population, in which case there
is a threshold degree of political inclusiveness above which political meritocracy dominates
democracy in terms of social welfare. As the country becomes more developed and mass
schooling becomes more widespread, the ability of the median voter increases, and the degree
of political inclusiveness should also increase. In other words, as a country becomes more
developed and voters become more educated, even a meritocratic system should become
more politically inclusive.16
Finally, it is useful to note that our simple model certainly does not capture all the realistic
features of the Chinese political system. What our model captures is the essence of political
meritocracy, which is the idea of distributing political power in accordance with ability,
as described in Bell (2015). Our analysis implies that this seemingly inequitable political
system can be more e¢cient than an equitable democratic system by improving the welfare
of the society. Therefore, the comparison between democracy and political meritocracy can
be viewed as an equity-e¢ciency tradeo¤.
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Appendix A: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. Given Ae  Am, (10) implies that  e  m < 0:5; see Figure 1.
Then, use (5) and (6) to show that L( e)  L(m) and Y ( e)  Y (m), where L 
R
1
0
Lidi
and Y 
R
1
0
Yidi. Finally, use (7) to show that G( e)  G(m).
17
Proof of Proposition 2. Given Ae  Am > A, (10) implies that  e  m < 
. Then, the
inverted-U relationship between U and  implies that U( e)  U(m) < U(
); see Figure
2.
Proof of Proposition 3. If Am < A, then (10) implies that m > 
, and U(m) < U(
)
by the denition of  . Given the inverted-U relationship between U and  , there exists a
value of  denoted as  < m such that U() = U(m). From (12), we can derive  explicitly
as
(m
 
) =
   1 
s
(   1)2   (2   1)

2
A
U(m
 
)  1

2   1
, (A1)
where U(m) is decreasing in m because m > 
. If  e   , then U( e)  U() = U(m);
see Figure 3 and 4. If  e <  , then U( e) < U() = U(m); see Figure 5.
Proof of Proposition 4. Recall that Ae is (weakly) decreasing in e and that  e is
decreasing in Ae. Therefore,  e is (weakly) increasing in e. If lime!0  e <  , then there
exists a threshold e 2 (0; 1) above which U( e)  U() = U(m), where  e   that is
derived in (A1). If lime!0  e >  , then U( e)  U() = U(m) for all e 2 (0; 1). In this
case, a rise in Am=A decreases m and increases U(m), which in turn makes an interior
threshold e 2 (0; 1) more likely to exist. When a binding interior threshold e 2 (0; 1) exists
as in Figure 6,18 a rise in Am=A that decreases m leads to an increase in  as (A1) shows.
Then,  =  e(e) implies an increase in e. Therefore, a rise in Am=A either does not a¤ect e
or causes e to increase.
17Recall that  i < 0:5 for all i 2 [0; 1]. Therefore, G must be increasing in  i.
18An interior threshold e may not be binding (i.e., e(e) > ) due to potential gaps in the general
distribution of Ai, in which case e is independent of Am=A until it becomes binding (i.e., e(e) = ).
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Appendix B: Generalized utility and production functions
In this appendix, we examine the robustness of our results by considering a more general
quasi-linear utility function given by
ui = Ci  
Li

+ v (G) , (B1)
where  > 1, v0(:) > 0 and v00(:) < 0. The production function is given by (2), where  > 0.
Substituting (2) and (4) into (B1) and maximizing utility yield the level of labor as
Li =

1  

 1
 1
A

 1
i . (B2)
Substituting (B2) into (2) yields individual is income as
Yi =

1  

 1
 1
A

 1
i . (B3)
(B2) and (B3) show that Li and Yi are decreasing in  (so long as  > 1) and increasing in
Ai (so long as  > 1 and  > 0). In the government sector, the balanced-budget condition
is given by
G = 
Z
1
0
Yidi = 

1  

 1
 1
A

 1 , (B4)
where A is now dened as a CES aggregate of individuals ability:
A 
Z
1
0
A

 1
i di
 1

. (B5)
Substituting (4) and (B2)-(B4) into (B1) yields the welfare function of individual i:
ui =
(1  )

 1

1
 1
  1

A

 1
i + v
"


1  

 1
 1
A

 1
#
. (B6)
Di¤erentiating (B6) with respect to  yields
@ui
@
=  

1  

 1
 1
A

 1
i +

1  

 1
 1
v0 (G)
 (1  )  1
(  1) (1  )
A

 1 = 0, (B7)
which determines the utility-maximizing tax rate  i for individual i as
(  1) (1   i)
 (1   i)  1
= v0
"
 i

1   i

 1
 1
A

 1
#
A
Ai
 
 1
. (B8)
The left-hand side (right-hand side) of (B8) is increasing (decreasing) in  i for  i 2 [0; (  1)=).
Also,  i is decreasing in Ai so long as  > 0 and  > 1. The utilitarian welfare function of
the society is given by
U 
Z
1
0
uidi =
(1  )

 1

1
 1
  1

A

 1 + v
"


1  

 1
 1
A

 1
#
, (B9)
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which is an inverted-U function of the tax rate  given v0(:) > 0 and v00(:) < 0.19 Di¤erenti-
ating (B9) with respect to  yields the socially optimal tax rate   as
(  1) (1   )
 (1   )  1
= v0
"
 

1   

 1
 1
A

 1
#
, (B10)
where the left-hand side (right-hand side) is increasing (decreasing) in   for   2 [0; (  1)=).
As in our benchmark model in the text, the median voters preferred tax rate m is
generally di¤erent from the socially optimal tax rate   unless the median voters ability
Am happens to equal the CES aggregate of individuals ability A. If Am > A, then we
have  e  m < 
 because Ae  Am. In this case, the meritocratic equilibrium is worse
than the democratic equilibrium in terms of welfare. If Am < A, then we have either
    e  m or  e < 
 < m. In this case, the meritocratic equilibrium may be better
than the democratic equilibrium in terms of welfare, depending on the degree of political
inclusiveness e. Therefore, all our results are robust to the generalized utility and production
functions.
19Here we also require v0 (:) > 1 as a su¢cient condition.
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Appendix C: Utility inequality
In this appendix, we compare the degree of inequality in individuals utility under the two
political systems. We measure utility inequality by the coe¢cient of variation of individuals
utility, which is dened as
U 
sZ
1
0
ui
U
  1
2
di. (C1)
From (8) and (12), we can derive the ratio of individual is utility ui to average utility U as
ui
U
=
0:5 (1  ) (Ai=A) + 
0:5 (1  ) + 
. (C2)
Substituting (C2) into (C1) yields
U =
1  
1 + (2   1) 
A, (C3)
where A 
qR
1
0
(Ai=A  1)
2 di is the coe¢cient of variation of individuals ability. Equation
(C3) shows that utility inequality U is decreasing in  given  > 1. Because the tax rate
in the meritocratic equilibrium is lower than that in the democratic equilibrium (i.e.,  e 
m), utility inequality in the meritocratic equilibrium is higher than that in the democratic
equilibrium (i.e., U( e)  U(m)). Here we use the simple utility and production functions
in the main text. Our result also applies to the generalized utility and production functions
in Appendix B.20
20Derivations are available upon request.
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